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aBsTracT
By concentrating on the work of  Angelo Poliziano (1454–1494), this article explores 
the questions about whether and to what extent fictional accounts of  reality may 
contribute to the crafting of  rational arguments. I will present Poliziano’s contribution 
to this debate as deeply embedded in a culture of  verbal and visual mediation, as was 
characteristic of  Renaissance philosophy. At a time and in a place (fifteenth-century 
Florence) where philosophy was open to forms of  experimentation involving words 
and images, Poliziano was keen to defend the legacy of  poetry, rhetoric and history 
within the tradition of  philosophical inquiries, and more specifically, the role of  
fiction in shaping arguments and tools of  analytical scrutiny. From an interpretative 
point of  view, one of  the guiding lines in my analysis will be the category known in 
contemporary philosophy as moral imagination, that is, the idea that the imagination 
has the ability to transcend the limitations of  individual desire and create the 
conditions for a broader engagement with reality. It is a type of  moral abstraction that 
allows ideals and values to become sufficiently general to be shared by communities 
(synchronically) and handed down by traditions (diachronically). It will be apparent 
how in Poliziano’s account fiction, understood as the narrative element invigorating 
rational argument, expands the scope of  imaginable possibilities while acknowledging 
the role played by the many constraints of  history (res) and persuasion (fides).
KeyWords: fiction, history, res, moral imagination, Homer, Horace, Angelo Poliziano, 
Renaissance philosophy
1 A first version of  this article was presented at the conference on “Pico and Poliziano in Late 
Medici Florence,” held at UCL, London (15 May 2017), to honour the memory of  Simona 
Mercuri (1976–2015), a most promising young scholar of  Poliziano studies, who sadly died in 
the prime of  her youth. I would like to thank here the organizers of  the conference, Francesco 
Bausi and Anna Corrias, for their kind invitation and their comments during the discussion.
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resumen
A través del análisis de las obras de Angelo Poliziano (1454-1494), este artículo se 
propone responder a dos preguntas: ¿Pueden las recreaciones ficcionales de lo real 
contribuir a la creación de argumentos racionales? Y, de ser así, ¿hasta qué punto? A fin 
de contestarlas, presentaré la contribución de Poliziano en este debate enmarcándola 
en una cultura de mediación verbal y visual que es característica dentro de la filosofía 
del Renacimiento. En un lugar y en un tiempo (la Florencia del Quattrocento), donde la 
filosofía se abría a formas de experimentación que implicaban palabras e imágenes, 
Poliziano se interesaba en defender el legado de la poesía, la retórica y la historia dentro 
una tradición especulativa filosófica preocupada en la capacidad de la ficción para con-
formar argumentos y proporcionar herramientas que favorecieran el examen analítico.
Desde un punto de vista interpretativo, una de las líneas rectoras de mi análisis coin-
cide con aquello que la filosofía contemporánea denomina «imaginación moral», esto 
es, la idea de que la imaginación tiene capacidad de trascender las limitaciones del 
deseo individual y crear condiciones necesarias para una implicación más profunda 
con lo real. Se trata de una forma de abstracción moral que permite que valores e 
ideales devengan en suficientemente generales para ser compartidos por comunidades 
(sincrónicamente) y heredados a través de la tradición (diacrónicamente). Demostra-
ré cómo, desde el punto de vista de Poliziano, la ficción —entendida aquí como el 
elemento narrativo que refuerza un argumento racional—, expande el alcance de lo 
imaginado posible al tiempo que reconoce las múltiples restricciones de la historia 
(res) y la persuasión (fides) en el dominio de la filosofía.
palaBras clave: ficción, historia, res, imaginación moral, Homero, Horacio, Angelo 
Poliziano, filosofía del Renacimiento.
Cur igitur pudeat philosophari? 
Angelo Poliziano, Lamia
1. InTroducTIon: The ImpacT of fIcTIon on phIlosophy
Do philosophers tell stories? Plato, famously, did. Are they supposed to tell 
stories? This question—the theoretical argument—is more complex and insidious 
than the first, the one dealing with the actual practice of  philosophical inquiry and 
its history. As both Aristotle and Kant have taught us, the fact that philosophers 
tell stories does not mean that they have the right to do so; in fact, philosophers 
are the ones who are supposed to ask the question about the law or principle (quid 
iuris or the quidditas) behind a given practice, regardless of  whether that practice 
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comes to fruition or not (quid facti or the quodditas).2 In arguing for a legitimate 
use of  fiction in philosophy and its limits, philosophers seem therefore to be in 
a quandary of  their own making, in their ever recurring attempts to discipline 
themselves while often resorting to one of  the most natural linguistic resources—
the ability to tell stories—which is shared by individuals and communities at any 
given time in history. Philosophe, cura te ipsum, one may then jokingly say paraphrasing 
a well-known proverb—provided that fiction can in fact be seen as a malaise that 
affects philosophical arguments.
In addressing the question of  the impact of  fiction on early modern philosophy, 
we cannot help regarding the period known as the Renaissance (ranging roughly 
from the second half  of  the fourteenth to the first half  of  the seventeenth 
centuries) as one of  the most fertile and rewarding research fields. It cannot be 
denied that a particular attention to ways of  verbalizing and visualizing thought 
was fuelled by such historical circumstances at the time as the blossoming of  
rhetorical studies, a culture saturated with images, and remarkable advances in the 
technology of  knowledge dissemination (one has only to think of  the printing 
press and its impact). This impulse to formulate thought in words and images 
took a striking variety of  forms: the more traditional treatise and the commentary, 
of  course, but also poetry, novel, drama, pageantry, dialogues, emblem books, 
painting, sculpture and architecture (Giglioni 2016a). It was certainly no accident 
that Horace’s tag ut pictura poesis (Ars poetica, 361: “poetry is like painting”) became 
the motto of  an age, and it quickly increased its metaphorizing potential in many 
directions within the ever expanding field of  human ingenuity, so much so that 
the motto was read quite liberally as ut poesis philosophia and ut pictura philosophia. 
The most vocal advocate of  this liberal use was certainly Giordano Bruno in his 
works Cantus Circaeus (1582) and De compositione imaginum (1591).3
2 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 13, 78a; Kant 1910–1980, III, pp. 99; IV, pp. 68. On Plato, see 
Brisson 1998 [1982].
3 Bruno 2004–2009 [1582], I, pp. 668: “Et ideo sicut in scriptura extrinseca atque pictura, quae 
serviunt oculis extrinsecis, duo requiruntur—ratio videlicet formae atque figurae characterum 
et imaginum, et materia atque subiectum in quo formae illae et imagines possint subsistere, 
manere et perdurare—, ita etiam in scriptura intrinseca atque pictura, quae serviunt oculis 
intrinsecis, duo sunt necessaria;” Bruno, 2004–2009 [1591], II, pp. 660: “Alibi dixi de cognatione 
quadam mira, quae est inter veros poetas, qui ad eandem speciem referuntur atque musici, veros 
pictores et veros philosophos; quandoquidem vera philosophia musica seu poesis et pictura est, 
vera pictura et est musica et philosophia, vera poesis seu musica est divina sophia quaedam et 
pictura.” On early modern interpretation of  Horace’s ut pictura poesis, see Hagstrum 1958; Lee 
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I like to describe this attempt to mediate thinking with textual and visual 
artefacts as a distinctive trait of  Renaissance philosophy. In this development the 
role of  rhetoric was ‘gargantuan.’ Since antiquity, no doubt, the special nexus 
of  the verbal and the visual in human thinking had been the preserve of  the 
discipline of  rhetoric. Enargeia (“vividness,” evidentia in Latin) and ekphrasis (verbal 
description of  visual works) are traditionally the most significant illustrations of  
this mediation (Galand-Hallyn 1995, pp. 99–121; Webb 1999). We also know that—
again since ancient times—the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric has 
been awkward and difficult, to say the least. And yet, because of  the original bond 
linking words and images together, the return of  rhetoric is a recurring episode in 
the history of  western philosophy; we may even say that, at the moment, we are 
still in the middle of  one of  such rhetorical turns in philosophy.
Having characterized Renaissance philosophy as a culture of  verbal and visual 
mediation, I have no qualms about recruiting an author like Angelo Poliziano 
(1454–1594) among its most interesting and representative figures, despite his 
many attempts at self-effacing and ironic deflection when addressing the question 
of  what philosophy is. As readers of  his works, we tend to take Poliziano’s 
cautious self-presentation at face value. Possibly, as a result of  his persuasive 
words, historians of  Renaissance culture and philosophy have concentrated 
their attention on his contributions to methodology (especially in philology and 
history), intellectual eclecticism, philosophical translation (especially Epictetus) 
and encyclopedism.4 Here I would like to argue that some extra room is left for 
looking at Poliziano as a philosopher.
For Poliziano, poesis and poetica represented the pinnacle of human endeavours in 
the field of knowledge. However, it wasn’t so much the idea of beauty that he wanted 
to pursue as the privileged object of poetry, but persuasion, understood as the ability 
to move oneself and fellow human beings to action by relying on the instruments of 
reason rather than coercion or deception. In arguing that the sphere of persuasion 
was broader than the one represented by aesthetic enjoyment, Poliziano’s view of 
1967; Dolders 1983; Marsh 1989–2013 [1997]; Barkan 2013. More specifically, for Poliziano, 
see Verde 1973–2010, IV, II, pp. 599–600, who reports a few notes written by Poliziano for 
a university course on Terence’s Andria: “formas imaginesque una spectantes, quasi discere 
ratiocinarique videmur quicquid sit, ut puta leonem, corvum, hominem.”
4 These aspects have been studied by Garin 1954; Maïer 1966; Verde 1973–2010, IV, III, p. 
1089; Garin 1994 [1961]; Grafton 1983–1993, I, pp. 9–44; Martelli 1995, pp. 7–71; Mandosio 
1996; Kraye 1997; Bausi 2003, pp. XXVII–XXXII; Celenza 2010; Candido 2010; and 
Robichaud 2010.
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poesis was heavily dependent on the tradition of rhetorical wisdom. Artistic creation 
did not aim at reaching a state of disinterested contemplation and playful recreation, 
but strove towards an active transformation of reality through the means of mimetic 
imagination, make-believe, empathetic recognition and the setting of examples that 
were worth imitating. We might call this type of rational engagement with reality 
‘poetic reason,’ and Homer, in Poliziano’s view, was the perfect embodiment of 
this kind of reason, both historically and theoretically. As the Iliad and the Odyssey 
had come to represent the epitome of the Greek ideal of paideia, Homer could be 
taken to signify the fulfilment of the very idea of humanity. In fact, for Poliziano 
it wasn’t too much of a strain to suggest that behind Homer (the historical record) 
there was Orpheus (the myth), that is to say, the idea of poetry as the force that 
turns inanimate beings into sentient agents of cultural progress, endowed with the 
rhetorical power of persuasion in its purest form (Poliziano 1996, pp. 5–6 [13–16], 
191–194 [283–317]).5 This resolute statement of poetic reason as a instrument of 
change and civilization was closely connected—almost interchangeable—with 
history, the discipline that, in Poliziano’s opinion, provided the actual records—the 
evidence, as it were—of the transformative power of words, symbolical remains and 
human imagination, but which also set examples to be imitated—better, examples 
which were willingly imitated because they were desirable.
This is one of  the decisive arguments in Poliziano’s defence of  poetry as 
the summit of  human accomplishments: enduring and memorable testimonies of  
poetic invention were paradigms that showed the possibility for ever defiant and 
irrepressible desire—especially in the form of  greed and ambition—to respond to 
the call of  reason. History demonstrated that desire could be turned into a force 
for good every time such drives as imitation, examples, honour, glory, rewards, 
praise and recognition were convincingly presented as sensible, credible and 
above all acceptable motives. The ancients used to call this power “decorum;” 
today we call it decency. In this respect, poetry, history and rhetoric represented 
for Poliziano the distinctive features of  moral imagination.
5 On the different representations of  Orpheus’s story in Poliziano, from La fabula di Orfeo 
to the poems Manto and Nutricia, see Bausi, who characterizes the Orpheus in the Fabula as a 
“fallimentare stagione all’inferno,” in evident contrast to the Orphus in the Silvae, where the 
mythical vates epitomizes the prodigious effects of  poetry. See Bausi 2006, pp. 28–34 (30); 
Bausi 1996, pp. 5–6 and 191–194. See also Garin 1994 [1961], pp. 356–358; Tissoni Benvenuti 
1986, pp. 71–88; and Boccuto 1993. On poesis and poetica in Poliziano, see Bettinzoli 1995 and 
Séris 2002.
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Moral imagination has become a staple of  contemporary philosophical and 
aesthetic reflection. Recently, David Bromwich has characterized moral imagination 
as the “identification of  ourselves with something quite radically not our own” 
(Bromwich, 2014b).6 This kind of  imagination represents an effort to overcome all 
those material and conceptual divisions that are interposed among the objects of  
our experience and that make our perception of  reality defective or dogmatically 
unilateral. The origins of  the notion of  moral imagination are usually traced back 
to Edmund Burke (1729–1797), who in his Reflections on the Revolution in France 
(1790) advocated the necessary preserving function of  cultural illusions—“the 
decent drapery of  life”.7 And yet the idea that standards of  judgment concern 
taste as much as moral thinking is also part of  the early modern reception of  
classical ideals of  decorum and civility. Moral imagination addresses the question 
of  where we are supposed to draw the line when extolling the representational 
powers of  the imagination and how far we can go in all those situations (fiction, 
trust, daydreaming, playing) when we are inclined to suspend (for a limited amount 
of  time and remaining vigilant) the critical power of  reason.
There is yet another reason why in Poliziano’s case to connect knowledge and 
desire through the paradigmatic function of  exemplary actions is essential, and it 
is a reason that has to do with the function of  teaching—a key component in his 
intellectual development. We know that, starting in 1480, Poliziano was involved 
in an intensive teaching programme at the Florentine Studium.8 A few names and 
titles will give us an immediate sense of  the breadth and diversity of  the courses 
he provided: Quintilian, Ovid, Statius, Rhetorica ad Herennium, Aristotle’s Ethics, 
Physics, Prior Analytics, Virgil’s Eclogues and Georgics, and many more. What also 
6 David Bromwich, interviewed by Jonathan Derbyshire, in Prospect Magazine (22 May 2014). 
See also Bromwich 2014a. 
7 Burke 1993 [1790], pp. 77: “All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of  a 
moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover 
the defects of  our naked shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are 
to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion.” On various developments in 
the ever expanding field of  studies devoted to moral imagination, see Price 1983, Johnson 
1993, Pardales 2002, and Tilmouth 2007. 
8 On Poliziano as a teacher, see Verde 1973–2010, IV, I, pp. 381–384, 415–418; II, pp. 491–
493, 540–544, 595–602, 632–639, 685–694, 768–771, 835–840, 904–910, 945–953; III, pp. 
1043–1048, 1087–1092, 1124–1135; Branca 1983, pp. 73–90; Cesarini Martinelli 1996; Bausi 
2006, pp. 41–52; Mercuri 2007, pp. XXVII–XLII; and Mandosio 2008.
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emerges from this list is that Poliziano taught philosophy through literature, and 
not just because he accompanied his lecturing with actual poetic productions (the 
Silvae were composed as introductions to his university courses) and because he 
did not hesitate to draw philosophical subjects from literary sources,9 but because 
for Poliziano the very act of  thinking could be seen as a craft in which rhetorical 
and narrative elements converged as one practice of  critical understanding. 
One might therefore say that, in the course of  his short but intense career, he 
demonstrated through the example of  his literary output—as a poet, a philologist 
and a teacher—the meanings of  such interrelated activities as thinking, reading and 
creating. As already mentioned, for Poliziano the unique historical and theoretical 
embodiment of  this vital interdependence was Homer.
2. homer as The faTher of phIlosophy
The encounter with Homer was a crucial experience in Poliziano’s intellectual 
career. It marked his entrance into the republic of  letters, and it was an entrance 
that was under the spell of  stories, or rather, the story: Homer’s Iliad. Indeed, to 
use a word that has now become dangerously fashionable, his very identity was 
shaped by that encounter: “ego is sum,” is what he proudly announced in his 
preliminary (and programmatic) lecture on Homer (Oratio in expositione Homeri), 
given in 1485:
I am the one who, still a boy, burned with such love and passion for this most 
eminent poet that not only did I smell of  Homer after I read the whole of  his work 
and almost wear it out by reading it so many times, but I also dared to translate him 
into Latin driven by some sort of  juvenile and nearly reckless familiarity.10
Not surprisingly, Homer is characterized as a vates—that is, a prophet, an oracle 
and a teacher—the first creator of  all sciences and ingenious ideas (doctrinarum 
9 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 229: “Plurima tamen in philosophorum maxime operibus 
invenias quae sint in poetarum nostrorum libros ascita.”
10 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 477: “Ego is sum qui ab ineunte adolescentia ita 
huius eminentissimi poetae studio ardoreque flagraverim, ut non modo eum totum legendo 
olfecerim peneque contriverim, sed iuvenili quodam ac prope temerario usu vertere etiam in 
latinum tentaverim.” In my translation I have oscillated between “Homer” and “his work” 
as the object of  Poliziano’s studium; the original Latin, however, is more direct, for Poliziano 
refers to Homer the author and Homer the work as one entity defined by the characteristic of  
personhood (eum).
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omnium atque ingeniorum autor et princeps).11 “I will demonstrate,” Poliziano declares 
in his lecture, that “never existed a greater mind (ingenium) than the Homeric one, 
nor a human work that should be placed before Homeric poetry.”12
In his study on Poliziano, Vittore Branca insisted on the important role 
played by the recently rediscovered Poetics of  Aristotle as a catalyst for Poliziano’s 
reflections on art and philosophy (Branca 1983).13 I am more inclined to think that 
in fact this role should belong to Homer rather than Aristotle—although Aristotle 
is a key author for Poliziano’s ideas on logic, the encyclopedic approach to learning 
and ethics, and although in a famous letter to Ficino, Poliziano presented himself  
as the Aristotelian between Marsilio the Platonist and Pico the biblical scholar.14 
In general terms, though, Poliziano goes back to Homer, and in particular, to 
Plato’s discussion of  Homer in the Republic, for, by completely reversing Plato’s 
argument, Poliziano states that in fact poetry is the best philosophy and is the true 
foundation of  political order.15
“What shall I say about philosophy?,” asks Poliziano in the lecture. His answer 
makes clear that almost every “noble thought or famous opinion” that we find 
11 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 477: “Dicturus de Homero vate, doctrinarum omnium 
atque ingeniorum autore et principe, et dicturus in coetu hominum, vel graece, vel latine 
doctissimorum: sentio nullam eloquentiam nec optari nec concipi posse, quae vel aviditatem 
animi nostri expleat, vel rei magnitudini respondeat, vel acerrimo denique iudicio vestro atque 
eruditissimis auribus satisfaciat.”
12 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 478: “planumque (ut arbitror) faciemus, neque ullum 
unquam extitisse ingenium Homerico maius, neque opus aliquod extare humanum, quod sit 
Homericae poesi anteferendum.”
13 On the diffusion of  the Poetica at the time, see Garin 1973.
14 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 135: “omnes in hoc incumbimus, ut recta studia pro virili 
iuvemus ac non ullo praemio, sed operis amore solicitati, semper hoc agimus tamen, ita dispensatis 
inter nos officiis ut nulla ferme studiorum parte cessetur. Etenim Picus ipse Mirandula sacras 
omnes literas enarrat, adversus ecclesiae septem hostes directa fronte decertat, inter Aristotelem 
iam meum Platonemque semper tuum caduceator incedit. Tu Platonem, quanquam et alios 
veteres, sed Platonem tamen ipsum maxime Platonicosque omnes, et latine loqui doces, et 
uberrimis commentariis locupletas. Mihi vero (quam diu catechumenos in philosophia vestra 
sum) varietas ista certe literarum cessit, quae non minus habent iucunditatis, etiam si minus 
autoritatis.” On Poliziano and his relationships with Ficino and Giovanni Pico, see Garin 1994 
[1961], Gentile 1998, Bettinzoli 2009, and Robichaud 2010.
15 On Poliziano reader of  Homer, see Grafton 1992, Galand-Hallyn 1995: 189–210, and 
Megna 2009. Paola Megna aptly describes Poliziano’s praelectio as a “lettura sapienziale di 
Omero” (Megna 2007, p. LXV).
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among philosophers was already in Homer.16 And to corroborate this point, he 
provides a long sequence of  passages, from Thales to the Stoics, whose source 
can be traced to Homer (Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], p. 479). Of  course, there is 
a good level of  conventional pleasantries and flourishes required by the rhetorical 
genre against which Poliziano is measuring himself—the encomium. On the other 
hand, the thesis of  poetry as prophecy, and therefore as a foundational element in 
the construction of  human knowledge, was not simply a matter of  embellishment, 
adulation or storytelling. When Poliziano awarded Homer of  the title of  vates, born 
in heaven from Calliope herself, the Muse of  eloquence and epic poetry (illi et 
patria coelum ipsum et mater esse Calliope), it’s because he thought that his mastery of  
language had traced the original coordinates of  human learning. And just as “the 
inspired seers, who in Greek are called prophets, cried out aloud their almost divine 
responses and oracles, as if  from some innermost and holy chambers inhabited by 
the gods,” so Homer was possessed by a divine force, which made him unaware of  
his earthly condition and divested his work of  all references to personal history and 
gain, completely devoted to the betterment of  humankind.17 In combining probity, 
judgment and vision, Homer was the perfect embodiment of  moral imagination.
What is especially significant in Poliziano’s portrait is the way in which Homer 
is described as a paragon of  virtue, almost of  a Stoic kind. Using Silius Italicus’s 
words, Poliziano characterizises Homer’s virtue as the self-rewarding effect of  
noble intent, the sibimet pulcherrima merces.18 By doing so, Homer had tamed the two 
16 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 479: “Quid dicam de philosophia, in qua nulla est ferme nobilior 
posterorum sententia aut opinio celebrata cuius non in poeta Homero originem agnoscamus.”
17 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 478: “Adeo videlicet sese supra hominis conditionem 
vates hic eminentissimus atque incomparabilis attollit, adeoque nihil mortale sonat, ut merito 
illi et patria coelum ipsum et mater esse Calliope videri possit. Atque haec ego de Homeri 
patria parentibus eo consilio attigi, ut intelligeretis quanta in illo viro altitudo animi rerumque 
humanarum despicientia qui in tot versuum millibus nullam de patria unquam parentibusque 
suis fecerit mentionem, imo vero, ne nomen quidem suum aut titulo addiderit aut carminibus 
inseruerit, sed ut fatidici vates, qui Graeco nomine prophetae appellantur, divina illa sua quasi 
responsa atque oracula, tanquam ex arcanis quibusdam sacrisque deorum adytis emugiverit, ut 
plane appareret, non eum sibimet illa, sed omni generi hominum, omnique posteritati elaborasse.”
18 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 479: “Admirandus profecto vir (quem tamen etiam supra 
virum crediderim) quem nulla solicitarit ambitio, nulla honoris cupido provexerit, nullum 
gloriae studium inflammaverit, omnia virtutis causa honestique patraverit, neque sese extra 
quaesiverit: Ipsa enim est virtus (ut poeta quidam inquit) sibimet pulcherrima merces.” See 
Silius Italicus, Punica, XIII, 663. On the theme of  virtue as self-rewarding action, see also 
Poliziano 1996, p. 141 [417–419]: “Namque licet virtus semet contenta quiescat / sola tamen 
iustos virtus adsciscit honores, / solaque se merito laudum fulgore coronat.”
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monsters that, in Poliziano’s opinion, have never stopped plaguing humankind: 
greed (avaritia) and ambition (ambitio).19 Homer’s training in moral integrity occurred 
through his insatiable desire to know more about reality, while his passion for 
knowledge drove him to explore innumerable countries and customs throughout 
his life.20 As a result, Poliziano goes on, “in Homer’s poetry we contemplate the 
examples of  all virtues and vices, the seeds of  all disciplines and the images and 
effigies of  all human things,” and—what is more extraordinary, but in fact follows 
from the creative power of  poetry—Homer, who “certainly had never seen these 
examples with his own eyes,” has managed to establish their reality (constituerit) by 
bringing them forth before our very eyes.21 Precisely because of  this unique form 
of  ontological constitutio, Poliziano may even say that Homer—the blind poet—
invented the art of  painting. Echoing a renowned topos attributed to the sixth-
century poet Simonides of  Ceos, Poliziano expands on the rhetorical commonplace 
that poetry deals with talking images while painting is silent poetry.22 It’s ut pictura 
poesis all over again, but, beyond all the encomiastic firework, the dictum confirms 
that, at the root of  all visual, poetic and reflexive arguments, it is the imagination 
and its power to produce images that are capable of  setting things in motion—and 
this is ultimately what artistic creation is all about.
19 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 479: “Idem et pecuniae possessionem divitiasque pro 
nihilo habuit, quarum vehementius studium praecepsque cupido divina omnia atque humana 
permiscuit, ita duas capitaleis humani generis pesteis, duo teterrima monstra, avaritiam atque 
ambitionem devicit penitus atque prostravit.”
20 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 479: “Quid dicam, quanta quamque inexplebili discendi 
cupiditate flagraverit, qui ab ineunte adolescentia etiam luminibus captus rerumque omnium 
egenus, ut qui sibi in diem victum carminibus quaeritaret, etiam peregrinationis incommoda 
subiit, ut mores hominum multorum multarumque civitatum consuetudines perscrutarent, 
eaque multiplici rerum peritia, doctior longe indies sapientiorque evaderet.” 
21 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 479: “Quo effectum est, ut in Homeri poesi virtutum 
omnium vitiorumque exempla, omnium semina disciplinarum, omnium rerum humanarum 
simulacra effigiesque intueamur, ipsaque illa nobis expressa expromptaque ante oculos 
constituerit, quae ipsemet profecto nunquam suis oculis usurpaverat.”
22 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 489: “Quid si eundem [Homer] picturae quoque 
magistrum autoremque vocemus, num opinor mentiemur? Cum praesertim sapientis dictum 
feratur poesin esse loquentem picturam, sicut e contrario pictura ipsa muta poesis vocatur.” 
Poliziano is referring to the dictum by Simonides of  Keos: “Poema pictura loquens, pictura 
poema silens.” See Plutarch, De gloria Atheniensium III, 347. See Poliziano 1996, p. 155 [564–
565], I: “Quin et Apellaeos digitis animare colores / monstrat.”
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 4, n.º 2 (2017): 215-241
Poliziano as a Philosopher, or The Craft of  Thinking between Fiction and History 225
By turning Homer into a true ontological category, Poliziano can therefore 
refer to Homeric virtue as a model of  both human and divine action. This means 
that his poetry is not only at the origin of  humankind’s progress, but it also 
represents the primordial unity where everything at the beginning existed as one 
and harmonious, before the split into the many disciplinary and ethical divisions 
started to afflict the life of  the human mind. This point is argued forcefully in one 
of  Poliziano’s Silvae, Ambra, where a line says that everything derives from and is 
in Homer’s work.23 Like Ocean, the original father of  all natural forms, so Homer’s 
voice—the most original and truthful—has fertilized the minds of  innumerable 
generations.24 As already mentioned, his words preceded the first utterances of  
ancient wisdom (sapiens vetustas) and they faithfully reproduce the primeval motions 
at the origin of  the world. Homer—not Hermes, nor Zoroaster—is therefore the 
priscus theologus (Poliziano 1996, p. 150 [515]).
As we will see in the rest of  this article, the thesis of  the ontological primacy 
of  poetry through the historical record of  Homer—the original undivided union 
of  truth and being—explains why poetry, in Poliziano’s opinion, has the power to 
promote the union of  knowledge and action: by recombining the most abstract 
truths (the self-reflecting intellect) with the drive to moral self-realization (the self-
rewarding virtue) through the creation of  both inspiring and believable examples 
(which means by making visible what is inherently invisible), poetry exercises an 
inherently edifying and civilizing influence in human history. There is a birth in 
nature that involves all leaving beings, but there is also a cultural birth which is 
first of  all due to poetry, the original nutrix, the wet nurse that, like Orpheus, has 
turned inanimate matter into animate forces of  change and progress.
3. The anImal ThaT We call “The phIlosopher”
Besides the provision of  paradigmatic models and the sense of  an original unity 
of  meaning and expression, there is however another key reason why, in Poliziano’s 
opinion, poetry is a fundamentally civilizing force: the function of  storytelling. 
The narrative component in poetry—the mythos—is no ancillary operation, for it 
represents the very mechanism through which ideas are transformed into examples. 
23 Poliziano 1996, p. 147 [481]: “Omnia ab his [Homer’s chartae] et in his sunt omnia”; ibid., 
580–581: “Omnis ab hoc doctas sapientia fonte papyros / irrigat.”
24 Poliziano 1996, p. 147 [476–480]: “Utque parens rerum fontes et flumina magnae / suggerit 
Oceanus terrae, sic omnis ab istis / docta per ora virum decurrit gratia chartis; / hinc fusa 
innumeris felix opulentia saeclis / ditavit mentes tacitoque infloruit aevo.”
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As is adroitly and yet forcefully argued in Lamia, the inaugural lecture for his 1492 
course on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, fiction is good—and is good for philosophy, too:
We like to chat for a little while, provided that it is to the point (ex re), as Horace 
says. For little stories (fabellae), even of  the kind recounted by grandmothers, are 
not only a rudiment of  philosophy, but sometimes even a philosophical tool.25
A story may foreshadow philosophy, but it can also be used to convey 
philosophical meaning. Moreover, to the inner cogency of  arguments, stories 
add the surprise of  accidental events. To stress this point, Poliziano asks for 
Aristotle’s support: “For, as Aristotle says, even philosophers are naturally inclined 
to stories, that is, they love stories. For a story consists of  wonder, and wonder 
engendered philosophers.”26 For both Aristotle and Poliziano, wonder is the 
unexpected revelation following the realization that things are not as we thought 
they were. In this sense, wonder is the beginning of  knowledge and the “mother” 
of  philosophers (Metaphysics I, 982b).
Lamia can be read as an elegant game in which Poliziano muses on whether 
he is in fact a philosopher by indirectly replying to some Aristotelian colleagues 
of  his—the “witches” of  the title—who were questioning his job at the Florentine 
Studium. Predictably, the first answer he provides is that the witches are right 
and he is not a philosopher.27 As he also remarks in Miscellanea I, he likes to 
think of  his philosophical contribution in terms of  a dessert offered at the 
end of  a sumptuous dinner prepared by proper philosophers such as Ficino or 
Argyropylos.28 In the same work, to remain in the sphere of  culinary and digestive 
25 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 451; Poliziano 2010, p. 194: “Fabulari paulisper lubet, sed 
ex re, ut Flaccus ait. Nam fabellae, etiam quae aniles putantur, non rudimentum modo, sed et 
instrumentum quandoque philosophiae sunt.”
26 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 461; Poliziano, 2010, p. 250: “Siquidem, ut Aristotelis ait, 
etiam philosophus natura philomythos, id est, fabulae studiosus est. Fabula enim admiratione 
constat, admiratio philosophos peperit.”
27 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 451; Poliziano, 2010, pp. 198–200: “Videamus ergo primum 
quodnam hoc sit animal quod homines philosophum vocant, tum spero facile intelligetis non 
esse me philosophum; neque hoc dico tamen quod id vos credam credere, sed ne quis fortasse 
aliquando credat; non quia me nominis istius pudeat, si modo ei possim re ipsa satisfacere, sed 
quod alienis titulis libenter abstineo.”
28 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 217: “Et hercle veluti bellaria sint ista, secundis accepta 
mensis. Quoniam rectae coenae speciem vicemque graviora illa occupant, qualia tibi multa vel 
Marsilius Ficinus Platonis, vel Aristotelis interpres Argyropylos Byzantius e philosophiae penu 
congesserunt.”
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metaphors, he describes his role in the philosophical kitchen as that of  providing 
digestive remedies which may aid the metabolism of  reading habits and favour the 
acquisition of  acquired tastes:
if  sometimes I have sprinkled a few difficult and painstaking—and to be honest, 
rather sour—points, drawn either from philosophy, to which I have been striving 
as a candidate for a while now, or from that system of  disciplines which attend to 
the study of  wisdom, these bits will perhaps restore and stimulate the stomach of  
a reader that has become enfeebled by eating over-sweet food.29
So, prompted by Poliziano’s own game, we should ask with him: What kind 
of  animal is the philosopher (quodnam hoc sit animal quod homines philosophum vocant)? 
And, more specifically: What kind of  philosophical animal is Poliziano? Can 
philosophers—and Poliziano as a philosopher—be emancipated by the act of  
fabulari? (Where fabulor is not simply the act of  having a conversation, but also the 
ability to tell stories.) To stress the relevance of  the narrative side in any exercise 
of  knowledge—and therefore reconfirm the ontological import of  poetry—
Poliziano adds the example of  Cicero’s way of  writing. In the inaugural lecture 
on Suetonius in the fall of  1490, he characterizes the function of  storytelling as 
the force that injects life and vivid presence into any argument, be that legal or 
philosophical:
if  in Cicero’s orations, where everything is said as it should, there are a few short 
stories that are recounted by going through the whole gamut of  emotions and 
feelings so that matters don’t seem to be said, but openly done and set before our 
eyes, how much more fruitful and abundant everything would appear in the most 
free field of  history, as if  this were the Olympic Games?30
29 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 214–215: “si paucula respersimus interim scrupulosa et 
anxia, quodque verius, subacida, vel ex philosophia, cuius iampridem sumus candidati, vel ex 
orbe illo disciplinarum, quae studio sapientiae famulantur, at ea stomachum tamen lectoris 
praedulcibus marcentem recreabunt fortassis et exacuent.” For the phrase “scrupulosa et 
anxia,” see Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, “Praefatio,” 13. On Poliziano and Gellius, see Grafton 
2004.
30 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 501: “Nam si in orationibus illis suis, ubi omnia ad 
praescriptum dicerentur, ita sunt quaedam breves insertae narrationes per omnes ductae sensus 
atque affectus, ut non dici res illae, sed plane geri atque esse oculis subiectae videantur, quanto 
uberiora tandem amplioraque omnia in liberrimo illo historiae campo, quasi in Olympiaco 
curriculo apparuissent” (Praefatio in Svetonii expositionem). The simile between rhetorical 
performance and running races in Olympia is in Rhetorica ad Herennium IV, 3. 
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When Poliziano says that history is the domain of  narrative freedom, an activity 
that is so free that one has the impression to be running at the Olympic Games, 
he is not taking historia to mean simply a reliable account of  past events; he is also 
not confining his understanding of  narratio to the faculty of  having conversations 
about the most disparate topics (fabulari) or sheer fictional invention (condere to the 
point of  falsa narrare simillima veris). The rhetorical question in the quotation above 
should rather be read as an a fortiori argument: if  we tell stories even in contexts 
where stories are not needed or appropriate, how much more important the act of  
storytelling will be when the crux of  the matter is to recount, that is, history and 
its liberrimus campus, that area of  writing practices where the mind seems to enjoy 
a condition of  almost absolute freedom. Here historia is the technical term that 
keeps together truth, desire and appearance, for the meaning of  historia wavers 
between account, story and vision; more precisely: between the original act of  
connecting words to ideas, the fictional tension of  make-believe and suspension 
of  disbelief, and imagination as the force that conjures up vivid representations 
of  things—ut pictura poesis. In this sense, history is the domain where things are 
not simply recounted but done, when ekfrasis and enargeia converge to make 
visible what otherwise would remains hidden and inarticulate in the depths of  the 
thinking process. Hence history’s natural closeness to politics and rhetoric, and, 
above all, freedom as its distinguishing characteristic. History is the place where 
reading and writing are a re-enactment of  virtue and acting.
It is therefore neither surprising nor far-fetched to argue that for Poliziano 
history is the essential link between poetry and philosophy. The key argument for 
him is that there cannot be real philosophy without examples to imitate. Two pithy 
lines from the poem Ambra captures this point extremely well: “He who is not moved 
by the idea of  a future generation, nor by the reputation that survives him, that is, 
by examples for other people, loathes his own life and he’s a fool.”31 The typical 
accoutrements of  historical narrative and public speaking, such as fama, posteritas and 
exempla, far from being an expression of  vanitas, are all vital values because, in a truly 
Nietzschean sense, they transform history from a taxidermic venture into a critical 
exercise in which examples are ways of  perpetuating life to future generations.32 It is 
31 Poliziano 1996, p. 142 [423–424]: “Quem neque posteritas neque tangit fama superstes, / 
nempe aliis exempla, sibi vitam invidet amens.”
32 The reference is, of  course, to Nietzsche’s On the Uses and Disadvantages of  History for Life 
(Nietzsche 1997 [1874]). On Nietzsche’s views on Homer, which have several points in common 
with Poliziano’s, see now Nietzsche 2017. 
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also clear that by endorsing a view of  virtue as self-rewarding action, Poliziano does 
not intend to side with an ascetic and analytic view of  philosophy, which, rather than 
capturing the imagination of  other people, frightens it with standards of  character, 
conduct and judgment that are way too lofty and forbidding. Instead of  being a 
justification of  pure moral intention dissociated from any material result, Poliziano’s 
idea of  self-fulfilling rectitude is all about action—epic, heroic, sublime action (all 
adjectives that, significantly, are literary genres as much as ethical categories)—and it 
is an idea of  virtue that cannot be dissociated from the paradigmatic effects created 
by feats of  glorious action, such as praise, honour, repute and decorum.
And yet traditionally philosophers like to pit virtue against glory. For Poliziano 
this is the wrong way to assess the profit (merces), the worth (precium) and the award 
(praemium) of  virtue.33 Virtuous action needs to be seen together with its glorious 
consequences: indeed, this is the only way we have to sneak a look at the invisible 
core of  virtue. Otherwise virtue, besides being an invisible experience, turns out to 
be unreal: “we can see that in these most calamitous times, virtue itself  has perished 
together with its fruit.” For Poliziano, there is a certain degree of  truth in saying that 
civilization and its records derive from a desire to be remembered for accomplishing 
illustrious deeds (cupiditas gloriae).34 Poliziano’s gloria means reputation, not ambition. 
He takes the Latin word in his objective—therefore social—meaning, signifying the 
particular stock of  beliefs that a community holds about a person or a work. Here 
glory is no subjective appetite for fame, which elsewhere he calls fastosa, “arrogant” 
glory.35 Indeed, the social function of  objective glory is to contain the otherwise 
untrammelled ambition of  subjective glory. What is more, unlike the ephemeral 
and fruitless productions of  individual self-conceit, civilizing and collective glory 
is better preserved through the many stories recounted about heroic and noble 
deeds: “What reward for true virtue is more honourable than glory itself, which has 
built for itself  a perpetual abode in the books of  the best historians, while it finds 
temporary accommodation in all kinds of  historical records”.36 In this sense, the 
33 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 499: “Negant sane philosophi quidam appetendam 
gloriam esse, eamque rectius a virtute velut minime necessariam negligi autumant. Virtus enim, 
inquiunt, ipsa sibi est precium, ipsa est per sese nullis extrinsecus illecebris expetenda.”
34 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 499: “videre est nostris his calamitosissimis temporibus 
etiam cum virtutis fructu, virtutem prope ipsam intercidisse.”
35 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 456.
36 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 499–500: “Praemium autem quodnam est honestius verae 
virtutis quam ipsa gloria, quae ut in reliquis monumentis temporarium aliquod habere diversorium 
potest, ita in excellentium historicorum libris perpetuum sibi domicilium fabricata est?”.
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free field of  history, which is the public arena where individuals may exercise the 
spontaneity of  their individual action, is also the place where communal memory is 
lodged in the form of  material and written evidence. So Cicero was right, Poliziano 
goes on to say in his lecture on Suetonius, when he characterized historical inquiries 
as a source of  intellectual enlightenment (lux veritatis) and a means of  driving life 
into institutions and traditions (vita memoriae).37 Through Cicero’s all-encompassing 
meaning of  history, as both a theoretical and practical pursuit, Poliziano finds 
a way of  legitimizing the narrative import of  philosophy. History provides the 
philosopher with a field, which is a vast repository of  subject matters engaging 
his mind, and a reasonably broad freedom of  movement, which in the end is the 
changeable expanse of  moral imagination—liberrimus ille historiae campus.
What is then the specific contribution of  philosophy in this discussion? If  
rhetoric, poetry and history, with their production of  desirable examples, seem 
to bridge the gap between individuals, communities and universals in relation 
to both knowledge and action, is there still room for philosophical inquiries in 
Poliziano’s world? We can certainly understand why, given this context, Poliziano 
preferred to present himself, beyond reasons of  studied unpretentiousness, as a 
grammaticus rather than a philosophus. Not surprisingly, it is especially in Lamia that 
Poliziano theorizes the role of  the grammaticus as an expert in all the disciplines 
related to the use of  language. “These are the functions of  grammarians,” he 
declares, “to examine and interpret every kind of  writers, poets, historians, 
orators, philosophers, physicians and lawyers.”38 Unfortunately, he continues, to 
be a grammarian today is very different from what it used to be:
Our age, barely acquainted with the ideals of  antiquity, has confined the grammarian 
to a role that is too narrow. Among the ancients, by contrast, this profession used 
to enjoyed such a great authority that grammarians alone were the censors and 
judges of  all writers, and for this reason they were also called critics.39
37 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 499–500. See Cicero, De oratore, II, 36.
38 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 461; Poliziano 2010, p. 244: “Grammaticorum enim 
sunt hae partes, ut omne scriptorum genus poetas, historicos, oratores, philosophos, medicos, 
iureconsultos excutiant atque enarrent.”
39 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 461; Poliziano 2010, p. 244: “Nostra aetas parum perita 
rerum veterum, nimis brevi gyro grammaticum sepsit; at apud antiquos olim tantum autoritatis 
hic ordo habuit, ut censores essent et iudices scriptorum omnium soli grammatici, quos ob id 
etiam Criticos vocabant.”
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As a grammaticus, Poliziano sees himself  as fully equipped with all the instruments 
supplied by philology, history and poetics so as to be able to embark on a critical 
survey of  reality. Moreover, as a critic, and not as a professional philosopher, he 
can remain loyal to his view of  poetry as the best instantiation of  philosophical 
inquiry, without losing track of  the countless historical accidents and accretions—
all perfectly meaningful—that derive from the use of  any language. And yet things 
are not so simple, for, besides being an elegant exercise in philosophical self-
effacement, Lamia remains a paean to philosophy. I would say that it has to be 
such a paean, for any defence of  poetry as philosophy risks to advocate (even 
unwittingly) the right to be deluded and to act in a delusional way, that is, to 
inadvertently promoting escapism and analgesic fantasy. The element of  critical 
thinking in Poliziano’s definition of  grammaticus needs therefore to be unpacked. 
The philosopher as a critic alerts his readers to the dangers of  acquiescence and 
reminds them of  the parlous state of  things in the real world.
As a result, philosophy is for Poliziano the discipline that “presses her favours 
on those who are awake, not asleep” (Vigilantibus enim se, non dormientibus ingerit):
in order for you to understand more easily what I said—that the greatest pleasure 
lies in philosophy—picture in your minds someone who has all the pleasures of  
this world, who knows nothing and lacks all judgment: is there anyone who would 
like to live the life of  this person? I don’t think so, just as no one would choose 
to always be drunk, always be a child and always be asleep, like Endymion. For, 
although there are indeed some joys in sleeping, those joys, however, are false, 
counterfeited, imaginary, not true, not solid and not clear. And why do you think 
we are all frightened by death? It’s because everyone finds what they don’t know 
dreadful, as something that is obscure and shrouded in darkness, just as, on the 
contrary, they love what they understand, as something that is clear and distinct.40
40 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 456; Poliziano 2010, pp. 224–226: “Sed quod voluptatem 
diximus esse in philosophia maximam quo facilius intelligere possitis, fingite aliquem vobis 
cunctis affluentem deliciis, qui nihil omnino sapiat, qui prudentia penitus vacet, an quisquam 
vivere huius vitam volet? Equidem non puto: sicuti nec semper ebrius, nec semper esse puer, 
nec dormire semper, ad morem Endymionis, eligat quispiam. Quanquam enim aliqua etiam in 
somnis gaudia sunt, falsa illa tamen, adumbrata, imaginaria, non vera, non solida, non expressa 
sunt gaudia. Cur autem et mortem prope omnes expavescimus? Quoniam puto cuique terribile 
quod ignoratur, ut quod obscurum, quod tenebricosum est: sicuti contra amabile quod 
intelligitur, ut quod apertum, quod illustre est.” On the interplay of  dreaming and waking in 
Renaissance philosophy and medicine, see Giglioni 2016b.
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Endymion, with his story of  deathless and ageless sleep, represents for Poliziano 
a state of  mental torpor, which may be good for the indefinite preservation of  the 
vegetative functions of  life, but it has no part in strengthening the fibre of  moral 
reasoning. On the contrary, numbness is bound up with that sense of  discomfort 
that humans associate with death. Only a condition of  awareness predicated on 
knowledge of  reality (historia) ensures that the human mind has a clear perception 
of  the state of  things in the real world:
if  we love what we know, why do we also love the very actions of  knowing and 
possessing knowledge? But this is precisely what defines philosophy more than 
anything else. So either we shouldn’t do and wish anything in this life, or we should 
put all our hopes in philosophy, our haven. Let us place the life of  human beings 
before our eyes: what is that life apart from a vain shadow, or, to use Pindar’s apter 
words, the dream of  a shadow? Man is a bubble, says an old proverb. Consider 
the elephant and the little hare, how stronger the one and faster the other are 
compared to us. What is this haughty glory (gloria fastosa) that most of  the times 
drives us headlong if  not mere nonsense and hot air? If  you look at that from afar, 
you may think that it’s something great; when you come closer, it fizzles out.41
There are degrees in the human ability to perceive reality behind the screen 
of  appearances, and there are also different ways of  protecting that ability from 
sudden and disruptive clashes with reality. An excessively keen sight may jeopardize 
the precarious balance that exists between the mind and its surrounding reality: 
“if  we were sharp-sighted like Lynceus, and we could see through bodies and look 
inside them, we would look at even the most beautiful people with revulsion, so 
many are the things that would appear to us hideous, loathsome and disgusting.” 
To prevent that an excess in clear-sightedness may turn knowledge into a purely 
destructive exercise, minds necessitate the buffer of  beliefs and imaginations that 
shield them from the shock of  raw, unprocessed reality:
41 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 456; Poliziano 2010, p. 226: “Si igitur quae nota sunt 
delectant, cur etiam nosse ipsum ac sapere delectet? At id maxime proprium philosophiae est; 
aut igitur nihil agendum in hac vita, nihil expetendum est, aut in sola philosophia, tanquam 
in portu requiescendum. Subiiciamus quaeso oculis hominum vitam. Quid ea est omnis 
praeter inanem umbram, vel, ut significantius ait Pindarus, umbrae somnium? Homo bulla est, 
antiquum inquit proverbium. Nam quantum viribus ab elephanto, quantum celeritate vincimur 
a lepusculo? Gloria haec autem fastosa, quae nos plerunque agit praecipites, ut nihil aliud est 
quam merae nugae? Ut nihil aliud quam nebula? Procul enim si spectes, magnum quiddam esse 
putes; ubi propinques, evanescit.”
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In conclusion, what is solid and long lasting in all our things? The weakness of  
our nature and the brevity of  our life lead us to think that sometimes something 
may stand firm or last. This may explain why the belief  of  some of  the ancients—
that our souls, by having being thrown into our bodies as in a jail, were paying 
the penalty of  serious crimes—although not entirely true, cannot nevertheless be 
dismissed as completely absurd. For, since the soul is united and glued to the body, 
extended and unfolded throughout the limbs and the passageways of  the senses, 
this soul seems to me to suffer a torment that is no different from the one to which 
the abominable Mezentius in Virgil subjected his unfortunate citizens.42
Philosophy is the discipline that mediates between Endymion and Lynceus, 
between illusion and disillusion, sleep and rude awakening. A philosopher cannot 
torture the human mind, as Mezentius—the heinous and irreligious Etruscan 
king—used to do with his enemies, when he would tie their bodies to festering 
corpses—“face to face,” as recounted by Vergil in the Aeneid (VIII, 483–488). 
Poliziano does not deny that philosophers are contented with “the contemplation 
of  the loftiest things (pulcherrima).”43 They are “devoted” to the knowledge of  
what is “high, divine and pure,” understood in its very source (in fonte), and this 
knowledge is called sophia in Greek and sapientia in Latin.44 Poliziano is also aware, 
however, that in mediating between Endymion and Lynceus, philosophers have 
the responsibility to account for the value and meaning of  beliefs that shape 
human communities and prevent them from falling apart. It is highly likely that, 
42 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, pp. 456–457; Poliziano 2010, pp. 226–227: “Nam si lyncei 
essemus, ac penetrare oculis in corpora et introspicere possemus, etiam formosissimum 
quemque nauseabundi aspiceremus, adeo nobis multa visu tetra et foeda prorsusque deformia 
occurrerent. Quid obscoenas commemorem voluptates, quibus poenitentia semper comes. 
Age vero, quid in rebus nostris omnibus vel solidum vel diuturnum? Nam ut stare aliquid aut 
durare nonnunquam putemus imbecillitas nostra facit atque aevi brevitas, ita quod veteres 
opinati quidam sunt animas nostras in corpora tanquam in carcere coniectas magnorum 
scelerum poenas luere, quanquan non omnino verum, tamen etiam nec absurdum plane videri 
potest. Nam cum sit anima iuncta agglutinataque corpori, ac per omneis artus, omneisque 
sensuum quasi meatus extenta et explicata, non alio mihi videtur supplicio affecta quam quo 
Mezentius ille Vergilianus miseros cives suos afficiebat.”
43 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 452; Poliziano 2010, pp. 204–206: “Sed inter omneis praecellere 
tamen eos, et esse quam honestissimos, qui rerum pulcherrimarum speculatione contenti sunt.”
44 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 453; Poliziano 2010, p. 206: “Quotcunque igitur pulchra, 
divina, sinceraque primo, hoc est, in fonte ipso sunt, eundemque tenorem peragentia, horum 
esse scientiam quandam, quae sophia nominatur, id nomen latine sapientia est, eiusque sophiae 
studiosum vocatum modo esse a se philosophum.”
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similarly to the victims of  Mezentius, in many of  our daily actions we live in the 
embrace of  death, for reality is a rather nauseous affair. Luckily, though, our eyes 
are not as sharp as those of  Lynceus, and instead of  attempting to disembody 
our perception through intellectual abstraction or falling in a dreamless sleep, our 
condition of  temporal agents invites us to resort to stories, provided that they 
have a relevant point (ex re) and are related to the life of  a historical community.
4. conclusIon: To reason, To raTIonalIze-perchance To dream
It is at this extremely delicate juncture—between persuasion (fides), recognition 
(verum) and innner transformation (exemplum)—that philosophy and poetry seem to 
reach a precarious and yet firm agreement. In the lecture on Suetonius, Poliziano 
explains that those who are regarded as the greatest poets were able to convince 
their audience of  any thing they liked. But in order to do so, as Cicero explained 
and did in his career as an orator, they also needed to be ‘historians’, that is, people 
capable of  handling reality and the impact that reality had on their imagination 
and that of  their hearers. What is more, as the Muses once reminded Hesiod, 
poets, insofar as they are chroniclers of  reality, know how to distinguish the truth 
from the falsity of  things (Scimus falsa quidem narrare simillima veris: / Scimus item, 
quoties libitum est, et vera profari). And to end this progression with a climax, Poliziano 
introduces the figure of  the legumlator, the mind who creates the laws of  a country. 
Here, at the level of  political inventio, is where the productive significance of  poetry, 
history and philosophy is at its highest (Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], p. 501).
Fides (belief  and trust) and facere fidem (to persuade) are the technical terms used 
by Poliziano in this discussion. Belief  and trust are what turns the virtue as self-
rewarding endeavour into a promise of  history and civilization. And while gloria 
(honour and praise) can be a noble motive behind the accomplishment of  virtuous 
actions, history has the advantage over both poetry and philosophy that it produces 
belief  (facere fidem) and garners consent among people. In this, history is more 
persuasive than any poetic or philosophical representations of  reality, which in fact 
must rely on the examples of  history if  they want to be believable (Poliziano 1970–
1971 [1553], pp. 501–502). Not only that; they need history if  they want to keep 
desire away from the opposite threats of  dull habituation and unhinged appetite. 
As said at the beginning of  this article, in Poliziano’s analysis of  the motives behind 
human action, examples sublimate the murky underside of  greed and ambition into 
a desire for insight and change. Significantly, Poliziano never demonizes cupiditas 
gloriae, the desire of  glory, every time glory means laudable and exemplary action. 
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Indeed, he does not demonize either cupiditas or gloria whenever they are understood 
as a force of  vital growth and a source of  civilizing effects. In this sense, it is correct 
to say that Poliziano learnt his philosophy at the school of  Homer.
If  we now go back to the beginning of  Lamia, the meanings of  fabella and res 
become clearer. Philosophers like to tell stories, but their stories have to be “to 
the point,” ex re, “as Horace says.” Here the meaning of  res is the matter under 
discussion rather than adaptation to external circumstances; it’s materia more than 
occasio. Let’s have a quick look at what Horace said in Satira, II, 6, which is the place 
referred to by Poliziano. This is Horace’s example of  telling stories ex re:
And so we start to talk, not about other people’s villas or houses, or whether Lepos 
dances well or not, but—and this is what really matters to us and is something that 
one should know—whether human beings are happy because of  their money or 
their virtue, what brings us friends, whether interest or honesty, and what the nature 
of  the good and the highest good are. While discussing these matters, my neighbour 
Cervius chatters away and recounts those bedtime stories that are commonly told by 
grandmothers, but he does so while sticking to the point (ex re).45
Cervius’s stories are aniles fabellae, and yet they are apposite developments of  
the conversation (fabulari), for they illustrate the matter (res) of  the sermo, that is, the 
meaning of  happiness, virtue, friendship; above all, they shed light on the nature 
of  the good. In this way, these stories manage to reconcile desire (cupiditas) with 
reality (res). Through Cervius, Horace retells Aesop’s story of  the town mouse 
and the country mouse, which at the end of  the poem reconfirms the ideals of  
frugality and restraint advocated by the poet at the beginning of  his satira (hoc erat 
in votis... nihil amplius oro, 1, 4).46
One might say that, as is the case with Poliziano, Horace’s relationship to 
philosophy was too elusive to be taken as evidence of  any real commitment. For 
some commentators, Horace’s interest in Stoic and Epicurean thought was a matter 
of  poetic occasion more than a consistent intellectual pursuit, just as Poliziano’s 
involvement with the philosophy of  the ancients was a response to professional 
45 Horace, Satires, II, 6, 70–78: “ergo / sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis, / nec male 
necne Lepos saltet; / sed, quod magis ad nos / pertinet et nescire malum est, agitamus, utrumne 
/ divitiis homines an sint virtute beati, / quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos / et quae 
sit natura boni summumque quid eius. / Cervius haec inter vicinus garrit aniles / ex re fabellas.”
46 As a further example of  recounting stories according to the res of  the situation and the time, 
see Cowley’s retelling of  the Horatian fable of  the two mice. Cf. Hopkins 1993, pp. 103–125.
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and didactic demands.47 This, however, is a reading that has the inconvenience of  
distorting the meaning of  Poliziano’s philosophical concerns. Res—reality more than 
circumstance—is what for him connects story to history and makes the storytelling 
significant even from a philosophical point of  view. Likewise, the philosopher is that 
particular animal that reminds all storytellers—including the philosophical storytellers—
to “vigilate” and keep their eyes wide open, not to fall in Endymion’s sleep, but also to 
avoid any direct and unmediated engagement with reality, a violent attitude symbolized 
by Mezentius’s torture and by Lynceus’s immodest and unvirtuous gaze. Between the 
extremes of  numbness and violation, Poliziano validates the philosophical dream of  
reason, as a kind of  investigation in which the critical powers of  the grammaticus are not 
suspended but enhanced through the use of  irony and imagination. And here it may 
be worth pointing out, in passing, that this philosophical consideration of  fiction has 
nothing to do with the political uses of  stories and myths that was being advocated 
at the time by some representatives of  Renaissance Aristotelianism as a means of  
controlling the unruly behaviour of  the masses.
We tend to think of  philologists as priests and vestals of  the written word, 
grim and stern in their efforts to enact the laws of  literary decorum. When I 
think of  Poliziano, my mind immediately goes to the “free” fields of  knowledge 
and playfulness. If  we look at the process of  thinking as a craft designed to 
train the imagination and memory of  human beings so that they become able to 
express and communicate what otherwise would be left dormant in the domain 
of  conceptual inarticulacy (with not a few risks attached), then the practice of  
reading takes on a crucial role. There cannot be proper thinking without proper 
reading. This is one of  the many provisos expressed by Poliziano in his Miscellanea 
of  1489. The diversity of  natural and human experience (varietas and disparilitas) 
is the catalyst (expultrix and irritatrix) that activates reading, understood as both a 
remedy against the dulling of  desire (fastidium) and a booster to hone perceptual 
discernment. This diversity is also the reason why silvae and farragines, far from 
setting the mind adrift, are modes of  inquiry that keep our mental faculties alert, 
ready to identify similarities and differences.48 An integral part of  the craft of  
47 For a few views concerning the philosophical attitude of  Horace, see Schrijvers 1993, Rudd 
1993, Moles 2002, and Mayer 2005.
48 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553], I, p. 213: “si varietas ipsa, fastidii expultrix et lectionis irritatrix, 
in Miscellaneis culpabitur, una opera reprehendi rerum quoque natura poterit, cuius me 
quidem profiteor tali disparilitate discipulum” (Miscellaneorum centuria prima, “Praefatio”). A 
similar strategy can be seen in the way in which Bacon characterizes the practices of  reading 
and writing. See Giglioni 2014.
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thinking lies in taking good care of  the imagination and in shaping it into a force 
of  moral agency. As indicated by Poliziano in his analysis of  exempla, gloria and the 
campus of  history, moral imagination depends on striking the right balance between 
virtue and spontaneity: “Often an excess in precision is counterproductive. And 
just as a dress that is appropriate and elegant adds to the authority of  its wearer, 
so one that is garish and over the top stains the good of  virtue with meretricious 
allurement.”49 Moral vision rests on a subtle interplay of  desire (cupiditas), action 
(virtus) and representational energy (imagines).
It is therefore moral imagination that warrants the philosophical import of  
fiction. Causes and laws, quiddities and reasons of  principle may have the unique 
privilege of  dwelling in the immutable space of  an eternal present. The prose 
of  facts and quoddities, however, is subject to the passing of  time and therefore 
requires stories about our imagined past and our imagined future in order for us 
to make sense of  those very causes and laws that we hold so dear. As noted above, 
Poliziano shares with Aristotle the view that the sense of  wonder announces the 
unexpected and liberating promise that things are not the way we thought they 
were. Being linked to wonder, stories are the accidents that periodically subvert 
our perception of  an inexorable series of  causes and effects in nature. Stories 
themselves, owing to their pliable and yielding nature, are exposed to the possibility 
of  being interrupted, as intimated by the proverbial wolf, which makes us unable 
to articulate words when we suddenly discover that it has been staring at us (lupus 
in fabula).50 And yet philosophers, as both Horace and Poliziano encourage us to 
think, are always there to find a way to recover the lost words and resume the 
interrupted conversation (be that a sermo or a fabula), and they do this by welding 




49 Poliziano 1970–1971 [1553]: 494: “Nocet enim profecto saepe nimia diligentia. Et ut cultus 
concessus atque magnificus addit autoritatem, ita accersitus ille atque fucatus bonam ipsam 
virtutem lenocinio contaminat” (Oratio super Fabio Quintiliano et Statii Sylvis). See Quintilian, 
Institutio oratoria VIII, 20.
50 On the various meanings of  the proverb lupus in fabula, see Erasmus, Adagia, IV, v, 50. 
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